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Abstract: Cognitive radio technology addresses the problem of the spectrum scarcity by allowing 
secondary users to use the vacant spectrum bands without causing interference to the primary users. 
However, several attacks could disturb the normal functioning of the cognitive radio network. 
Primary user emulation attack is one of the most severe attacks in which a malicious user emulates 
the primary user signal characteristics to either prevent other legitimate secondary users from 
accessing the idle channels or causing harmful interference to the primary users. There are several 
proposed approaches to detect the primary user emulation attackers. However, most of these 
techniques assume that the primary user location is fixed which does not make them valid when 
the primary user is mobile. In this paper, we propose a new approach based on Kalman filter 
framework for detecting the primary user emulation attacks with a mobile primary user. Several 
experiments have been conducted and the advantages of the proposed approach are demonstrated 
through the simulations. 
Keywords: Cognitive radio; primary user emulation attacker; mobile primary user; Kalman filter; 
Received Signal Strength 
 
1. Introduction 
Cognitive radio (CR) technology is a viable solution that addresses the problem of the spectrum 
scarcity [1]. It enables secondary users to sense, dynamically adjust their transmission parameters, 
and access the idle frequency channels (spectrum holes) without causing any harmful interference to 
the primary users [2]. Due to the unreliable nature of the wireless communication, cognitive radio 
networks can be subject to various cyber-attacks which can have a negative impact on their 
performance [3-5]. Examples of these attacks include asynchronous sensing attacks [3], primary user 
emulation (PUE) attacks [5, 6], spectrum sensing data falsification (SSDF) attacks [6, 7], and jamming 
attacks [8, 9].  
A PUE attack targets the CR physical and MAC layers and is considered as one of the most 
severe attacks in which a malicious user emulates the transmission characteristics of the primary user 
(PU) and mimics its behavior to mislead legitimate secondary users. Such an attack can create a 
harmful interference to the primary user and prevent other secondary users from using the idle 
spectrum frequency channels [5, 6]. There are two types of primary user emulation attackers [10]: 
selfish and malicious. The purpose of the selfish attacker is to use and selfishly exploit an idle 
frequency channel without sharing it with other legitimate secondary users. The malicious attacker, 
on the other hand, aims at causing a denial of service in cognitive radio networks, and preventing 
secondary users from accessing the available frequency channels.  
Several approaches have been proposed to cope with the PUE attacks [11–24]. For instance, the 
authors of [11] proposed an energy-based detection approach to detect the source of the signal and 
decide if it is emitted by a legitimate primary user or an attacker. In their approach, each secondary 
user measures the power level of the received signal and compares it to that from a legitimate PU. 
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The authors of [12] proposed a belief propagation framework based on Markov random field to detect 
the primary user emulation attacker. Each secondary user decides whether the signal is coming from 
a legitimate primary user or not using the energy detection technique then calculates the belief and 
exchanges it with other secondary users. If the average of the belief values is lower than a predefined 
threshold, then the signal is coming from a malicious user, otherwise it is coming from a legitimate 
user. However, techniques based on energy detection are not efficient in distinguishing between 
noise and signal, and they suffer from a high probability of false alarm [13].  
Feature-based techniques, such autocorrelation and matched filter [14, 15], are also inefficient in 
distinguishing between the PU signals and those of the PUE attacker. For instance, the authors of [16] 
used the cyclostationary feature of the transmitter’s signal to detect the source of the incoming signal. 
However, this technique is not efficient in detecting malicious user which can mimic the primary user 
signal features. In [17], the authors proposed a radio-frequency fingerprinting detection technique. 
In this technique, the transmitter is identified based on some unique radiometric features extracted 
from its analog signals. In another paper [18], the authors proposed a detection technique using the 
characteristics of wireless channels. As the statistical property of the wireless channel between the 
transmitter and the receiver is unique in a wireless environment, this feature is used as a radio 
fingerprint to detect the primary user emulation attacker. However, radio fingerprinting based 
approaches require additional hardware or software to implement. In addition, these techniques are 
inefficient in identifying effectively the primary user signal since the characteristic of the noise 
introduced by the hardware is random.  
Other techniques have been proposed to estimate the position of the transmitter and compare 
the estimated position with the known position of the primary user. The authors of [19] proposed a 
time difference of arrival (TDoA) based approach to estimate the position of the transmitter. In this 
approach, the time elapsed between the transmission of the signal and the reception of the reply is 
used to estimate the location of the transmitter. Thought TDoA can estimate more accurately the 
transmitter position than other techniques, it requires a tight synchronization between the 
transmitters and the receivers which is challenging. In [20], the authors proposed an angle of arrival 
based approach for detecting the transmitter’s position. In this approach, the direction of the received 
signal is measured at different reference nodes then by applying the triangulation technique, the 
transmitter location can be estimated. However, this technique is affected by the multipath 
phenomenon [21]. The authors of [22] proposed a mitigation approach to distinguish the primary 
user signal from other signals via an energy-efficient localization technique and channel parameter 
variance. The authors of [23] proposed a model based on the trilateration, the received signal strength 
(RSS), and the particle swarm optimization to increase the detection accuracy of the primary user 
emulation attacker. All the previously mentioned techniques do not deal with uncertainty which 
affects the measurements. The authors of [24] proposed a Bayesian model and trilateration technique 
for detecting the primary user emulation attack position. Based on the received signal strength, the 
Bayesian decision theory is used to deal with the uncertainty related to the primary user environment 
and increase the detection accuracy of the primary user position.  
The existing localization techniques assume that the primary user position is fixed and known. 
However, in wireless communication networks where the primary user is mobile, such as cognitive 
radio ad hoc networks, these techniques are inefficient. Therefore, in this paper, we propose a 
localization approach to detect the primary user emulation attacks with a mobile primary user. The 
proposed approach is based on the Kalman filter framework for predicting the location of a mobile 
primary user and detecting the primary user emulation attacker.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section II, we describe the proposed 
localization approach based on Kalman filter. In section III, we first present the metrics used for 
evaluating the proposed approach’s performance, then we discuss some examples of results and 
compare the proposed approach with the RSS-based location technique. Finally, some conclusions 
are drawn in the last section. 
2. Methodology  
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The proposed approach is based on the Kalman filter framework for tracking the primary user 
location and deciding if the incumbent signal is emitted by a legitimate primary user or from an 
attacker. Figure 1 shows the flowchart of the proposed approach. The primary user position is tracked 
using Kalman filter [25], then the distance, 𝑑𝑘𝑓𝑖 , between a node 𝑖 and the legitimate primary user is 
estimated. Next, the received power of the transmitter is used to calculate the distance, 𝑑𝑝𝑖 , between 
the node 𝑖 and that transmitter using the Free Space Path Loss equation. If the difference between 
𝑑𝑘𝑓𝑖  and 𝑑𝑝𝑖  is greater or equal to a predefined threshold 𝜏, then the transmitter is an attacker. 
Otherwise, it is a legitimate primary user. 
Figure 1. Flowchart of the proposed approach 
In this work, we assume that the primary user is moving in a two-dimensional field and its state 
is described by its position and its velocity. This state is represented as:  
                 𝑥𝑘 = [𝑥(𝑘)   𝑦(𝑘)   𝑣𝑥(𝑘)   𝑣𝑦(𝑘)]
𝑇                          (1)                                                                                 
Where ( 𝑥(𝑘), 𝑦(𝑘) ) are the coordinates of the primary user position at the time 𝑡𝑘  and 
(𝑣𝑥(𝑘), 𝑣𝑦(𝑘)) are the velocities of the primary user in 𝑥 and 𝑦-directions at time 𝑡𝑘, respectively. In 
addition, we assume that the movement of the primary user is locally linear within the sampling 
interval. Thus, its motion can be modeled as:  
                    𝑥𝑘+1 = 𝐴𝑘𝑥𝑘 + 𝐵𝑘𝑢𝑘 + 𝑤𝑘                         (2) 
Where 𝐴 and 𝐵 represent the transition matrix and the control matrix, respectively. 𝑢𝑘 is the 
acceleration of the primary user and 𝑤𝑘 is a white Gaussian noise with zero mean and covariance 
matrix 𝑄, which is given by:  
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𝑄 = [
𝜎2𝑤𝑥 0 
0 𝜎2𝑤𝑦
] 
Where 𝜎2𝑤𝑥and 𝜎
2
𝑤𝑦 are the covariances of 𝑤𝑥 and 𝑤𝑦 which correspond to the acceleration 
noise of the primary user along the X-axis and Y-axis, respectively. The transition and the control 
matrix are given by: 
𝐴𝑘 = [
1 0 ∆𝑡𝑘 0
0 1 0 ∆𝑡𝑘
0 0 1  0
0 0 0 1
] , 𝐵𝑘 =
[
 
 
 
 
 
∆𝑡𝑘2
2 
∆𝑡𝑘2
2 
∆𝑡𝑘
∆𝑡𝑘 ]
 
 
 
 
 
 
Where ∆t𝑘 = 𝑡𝑘+1 − 𝑡𝑘 is the sampling interval time between two successive measurements at 
𝑡𝑘+1 and 𝑡𝑘. The measurement model 𝑧𝑘 adopted is given by:   
                               𝑧𝑘 = 𝐶𝑥𝑘 + 𝑣𝑘                              (3) 
Where 𝐶  is the measurement matrix and 𝑣𝑘  is the measurement noise which is a white 
Gaussian noise with zero mean and covariance matrix 𝑅. 𝐶 is given by: 
𝐶 = [
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
] 
During the first process of Kalman filter, the state of the primary user ?̂?𝑘+1 and its associated 
covariance error matrix 𝑃𝑘+1 at time 𝑡𝑘+1 are predicted using the following equations: 
                            ?̂?𝑘+1 = 𝐴𝑘?̂?𝑘 + 𝐵𝑘𝑢𝑘,                            (4) 
                        𝑃𝑘+1 = 𝐴𝑘𝑃𝑘𝐴𝑘
𝑇 + 𝑄𝑘 ,                             (5) 
Where ?̂?𝑘  is the primary user state at time 𝑘, 𝑃𝑘  is the covariance error matrix at time 𝑘, and 𝐴𝑘
𝑇 
is the transpose of transition matrix 𝐴 at time 𝑘. During the update process of Kalman filter, the 
estimated state and its covariance error matrix at time 𝑘 + 1 are updated and corrected using the 
Kalman filter gain 𝐺𝑘+1 as follows:   
                           𝐺𝑘+1 = 𝑃𝑘+1𝐶
𝑇(𝐶𝑃𝑘+1𝐶
𝑇 + 𝑅)−1,                      (6) 
                    ?̂?′𝑘+1 = ?̂?𝑘+1 + 𝐺𝑘+1(𝑧𝑘 − 𝐶?̂?𝑘+1),                       (7) 
                          𝑃′𝑘+1 = 𝑃𝑘+1 − 𝐶?̂?𝑘+1𝑃𝑘+1,                           (8) 
Where 𝐶𝑇is the transpose matrix of the measurement matrix 𝐶, ?̂?′𝑘+1 is the updated state of the 
primary user state at 𝑘 + 1 , and 𝑃′𝑘+1 is the updated covariance error matrix 𝑃𝑘+1 . Once the 
coordinates of the primary user position (𝑥𝑝, 𝑦𝑝 ) are estimated using Kalman filter, the distance 
𝑑𝑘𝑓𝑖  between a fixed position of an anchor node (𝑥𝑖 , 𝑦𝑖) and the primary user can be obtained using 
the following equation:  
                     𝑑𝑘𝑓𝑖 = √(𝑥𝑝 − 𝑥𝑖)2 + (𝑦𝑝 − 𝑦𝑖)2,                            (9) 
In order to verify if the incoming signal is emitted by a legitimate primary user or by an attacker, 
a distance 𝑑𝑝𝑖 between the transmitter and a node 𝑖 is required. This distance can be obtained from 
the received power signal of the transmitter using the Free Space Path Loss equation [24]:   
                            𝑃𝑟 = 
𝑃𝑡𝐺𝑡𝐺𝑟𝜆
2
(4𝜋𝑑𝑝𝑖)
2                                     (10)                                                                                       
Where 𝑃𝑟  is the received power, 𝑃𝑡  is the transmitted power, 𝐺𝑟  is the antenna gain of the 
receiver, 𝐺𝑡 is the antenna gain of the transmitter, 𝜆  is the wavelength, and 𝑑𝑝𝑖  is the distance 
between an anchor node 𝑖 and the transmitter. The equation (10) can be expressed in dB as:  
                       𝑃𝑟(𝑑𝐵) = −10𝛼𝑙𝑜𝑔10(𝑑𝑝𝑖  ) + 𝐴                            (11)                                                                                       
Where 𝛼 is the propagation path loss exponent and 𝐴 is expressed as:  
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               𝐴 = 10𝑙𝑜𝑔10(𝑃𝑡𝐺𝑡𝐺𝑟𝜆
2 ) − 20𝑙𝑜𝑔10(4𝜋 )                             (12) 
The received signal strength at an anchor node 𝑖 can be impacted by the noise, the equation (12) 
can be written as:  
                          𝑃𝑟(𝑑𝐵) = −10𝛼𝑙𝑜𝑔10(𝑑𝑝𝑖) + 𝐴 + 𝑛𝑖                                   (13)                                                                                       
 
Where 𝑛𝑖  is a white Gaussian noise that follows the normal distribution  𝑁(0, 𝜎
2). Thus, the 
distance 𝑑𝑝𝑖 can be estimated as: 
                      𝑑𝑝𝑖 = 10
(𝐴+𝑛𝑖−𝑝𝑟)
10𝛼                                      (14)     
By comparing the difference between the estimated distance 𝑑𝑘𝑓𝑖 and 𝑑𝑝𝑖 at an anchor node 𝑖 
to a predefined threshold 𝜏, the transmitter is considered as a primary user emulation attacker if the 
|𝑑𝑘𝑓𝑖 − 𝑑𝑝𝑖|≥ 𝜏 and as a legitimate primary user when the |𝑑𝑘𝑓𝑖 − 𝑑𝑝𝑖| < 𝜏.  
3. Results 
Due to a number of random variables used in the proposed approach, including the acceleration 
noise, the measurement noise and the signal noise, the Monte Carlo simulation was used to handle 
the uncertainty in the simulation. The proposed approach was implemented in Matlab and 
extensively tested and evaluated using several metrics including the probability of detection, the 
probability of false alarm, and the probability of miss detection. Additionally, the proposed approach 
was compared to an RSS-based localization technique. 
The probability of detection, 𝑃𝑑 , corresponds to the number of times where the primary user 
emulation attacker signal is correctly classified as an attack divided by the total number of trials. It is 
given by:  
                    𝑃𝑑 = 
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑃𝑈𝐸 𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑠
                               (15)                                                                                       
The probability of false alarm, 𝑃𝑓𝑎 , corresponds to the number of times where the legitimate 
primary user signal is wrongly classified as an attack divided by the total number of trials. It is 
expressed as: 
                    𝑃𝑓𝑎 = 
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒 𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑠
                         (16)                                                                                       
The probability of miss detection, 𝑃𝑚, corresponds to the number of times where an attack is 
incorrectly classified as a normal signal divided by the total number of trials. It is given by:  
                    𝑃𝑚 = 
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠 𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑠
                              (17)                                                                                       
 Examples of results are given in Figure. 2 through 7. Figure 2 shows the scenario used for 
tracking the primary user trajectory with Kalman filter. As one can see, the predicted trajectory is 
almost the same as the actual trajectory of the legitimate primary user.  
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Figure. 2.  Scenario used for tracking the primary user with Kalman filter. 
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Figure 3 shows the probability of detection as a function of the distance, 𝑑𝑝𝑢_𝑝𝑢𝑒, between a 
mobile primary user and a primary user emulation attacker for different SNR values. As one can see, 
the probability of detection increases as the distance between the primary user and the attacker 
increases. For example, for an SNR value of -10dB, the probability of detection is equal to 37% when 
the distance between the primary user and the attacker is 50m, and this probability increases to 60% 
when the distance is equal to 100m. In addition, this figure shows that the probability of detection 
increases with the increase of SNR values. For instance, for a distance of 50m between the PU and the 
PUE attacker, the probability of detection is equal to 37%, 80%, 96%, 99,2%, 99,7% for an SNR value 
corresponding to -10dB, -5dB, 0 dB, 5dB, 10dB, respectively.  
 
Figure. 3. The probability of detection as a function of the distance 𝑑𝑃𝑈_𝑃𝑈𝐸 between a mobile PU 
and a PUE. 
Figure. 4 shows the probability of detection as a function of the probability of false alarm for a 
distance 𝑑𝑝𝑢_𝑝𝑢𝑒 of 30m between the primary user and the primary user emulation attacker. As it can 
be observed, the probability of detection increases with the increase of the probability of false alarm. 
For example, for an SNR value of -15dB and with a probability of false alarm of 10%, the 
corresponding probability of detection is 16%, and when the probability of false alarm increases to 
30%, the probability of detection is equal to 61%. In addition, with the increase of the SNR value, the 
probability of detection increases. For instance, with a probability of false alarm of 2%, the probability 
of detection is equal to 39%, 63% 90%, 99%, and 100% for an SNR value corresponding to -15dB,     -
10dB, -5dB, 0dB, and 5dB, respectively. 
Figure. 4. Probability of detection as a function of the probability of false alarm for 𝑑𝑃𝑈_𝑃𝑈𝐸 = 30m. 
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Figure. 5 shows the probability of miss detection as a function of the distance 𝑑𝑝𝑢_𝑝𝑢𝑒 between a 
mobile primary user and a primary user emulation attacker. As it can be observed, the probability of 
miss detection decreases as the distance between the PU and the PUE increases. For example, for an 
SNR value of -10dB, the probability of miss detection is equal to 65% when the distance between the 
primary user and the attacker is equal to 50m, and it decreases to 41% when the distance increases to 
100m. In addition, this figure shows that when the SNR value increases, the probability of miss 
detection decreases. For example, with a distance of 110m between the primary user and the attacker, 
the probability of miss detection is equal to 37%, 10%, 5%, 1%, and 0% for SNR values of -10dB, -5dB, 
0dB, 5dB, 10dB, respectively. 
Figure. 5. Probability of miss detection as a function of the distance 𝑑𝑃𝑈_𝑃𝑈𝐸  between the mobile PU and 
a PUE. 
Figure. 6 shows a comparison between the proposed approach and an RSS-based localization 
technique in terms of the probability of detection as a function of distance with an SNR value of      
-10dB. As shown in this figure, the probability of detection for the proposed as well as the RSS-based 
localization approaches is low when the attacker is in a close proximity to the legitimate primary user 
location. When the distance increases, the probability of detection of the proposed approach increases 
while it remains almost the same for the RSS-based localization technique. For instance, when the 
distance between the primary user emulation attacker and the primary user is equal to 50m, the 
probabilities of detection of the proposed approach and the RSS-based localization technique are 24% 
and 16%, respectively. When the distance increases to 100m, the probability of detection of the 
proposed approach increases to 49% while it remains equal to 16% for the RSS-based localization 
approach. 
Figure. 6. Comparison between the proposed technique and the RSS-based localization technique in 
terms of the probability of detection as a function of the distance. 
 
0 50 100 150
Distance between a mobile PU and a fixed PUE attacker(m)
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
P
ro
b
a
b
ili
ty
 o
f 
m
is
s
 d
e
te
c
ti
o
n
 
SNR = -10
SNR = -5
SNR = 0
SNR = 5
SNR = 10
d
pu_pue 
(m) 
d
pu_pue 
(m) 0 50 100 150
Distance between a mobile PU and a fixed PUE attacker(m)
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
P
ro
b
a
b
ili
ty
 o
f 
D
e
te
c
ti
o
n
 
Proposed approach
RSS-based localization approach
 8 of 10 
 
Figure. 7 illustrates a comparison between the proposed technique and the RSS-based 
localization technique in terms of the probability of miss detection as a function of the distance with 
an SNR value equal to -10dB. As one can see, the probabilities of miss detection of the proposed 
approach and the RSS-based localization technique are high when the attacker is close to the primary 
user location. When the primary user starts moving and the distance becomes larger, the probability 
of miss detection of the proposed approach decreases while it remains the same for the RSS-based 
localization technique. For example, when the distance is 50m, the probabilities of miss detection of 
the proposed approach and the RSS-based localization technique are 76% and 84%, respectively. 
When the distance increases to 150m, the probability of miss detection of the proposed approach 
decreases to 19% while it remains equal to 84% for the RSS-based localization technique.  
 
Figure. 7. Comparison between the proposed technique and the RSS-based localization technique in 
terms of the probability of miss detection as a function of the distance. 
4. Conclusions 
Cognitive Radio networks are subjects to several cyber-attacks. Primary user emulation attack 
is one of the most severe attacks that can impact the normal functioning of these networks. In this 
paper, we propose a new approach for detecting the primary user emulation attacker with a non-
stationary primary user. Kalman filter is used for tracking and estimating the position of the mobile 
primary user, then the received power of the transmitter is used to detect any potential primary user 
emulation attacker. Several experiments have been conducted and the model has been extensively 
tested and compared to the RSS-based location approach. The results show that the proposed 
approach produces satisfactory results in terms of tracking the primary user in a non-stationary 
environment and it outperforms the RSS-based localization technique. However, the proposed 
technique has a few limitations that need to be addressed in future works. These limitations include 
finding the initial coordinates of the primary user, handling the uncertainty in measurements, and 
dealing with non-linear system dynamics. 
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